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GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
CORPORATE LAW
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL*
The practitioners of law and economics have done an enormous favor
for all of us who are concerned with corporate law. This favor comes in
two parts. On the one hand, they have sharpened, indeed radicalized, the
paradigm of the stockholder-centric corporation on which corporate law has
been built since the middle of this century, revealing as they have done so
the startling weaknesses and unreality of that paradigm.' On the other hand,
these scholars have deconstructed the traditional fiction of the corporation
to reveal the reality of competing interests within the corporation that have
nonetheless been excluded from the legal model of the corporate form.
This, of course, is the contractual model of the corporation.2 In doing so,
they have exposed for attention the interests of a variety of constituents
that corporate law has heretofore ignored. Although these scholars have
built a new, if highly disputed, model of the corporation as contract to
provide an infrastructure to replace the old entity, they have done so with
zealous regard for the traditional paradigm that centers on the stockholders.
As a result of these scholars' efforts, the central underlying issues in
corporate law have been exposed as never before. What is the nature and
the purpose of the corporation in modern American society? Their clear
answer is to maximize the wealth of stockholders, as a consequence of
which overall social wealth will be maximized by virtue of market mechan-
isms.3 In order for this to be accomplished, the markets that revolve around
the corporation, including markets for capital, labor, supplies, and outputs,
must be kept as efficient as possible, with only the first and, possibly, the
second, 4 coming within the province of corporate law. These scholars have
identified the costs and barriers which can impede market efficiency, and
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center. I would
like to thank my colleague Miriam Galston for her helpful comments on this piece.
1. The most complete statement of the stockholder-centered approach is FRANK H.
EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FisCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
2. A good statement of the contractual model of the corporation is provided in Henry
N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. Rnv. 99 (1989).
An insightful analysis of this contractual theory is provided in William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407 (1989).
3. Stockholder wealth maximization is the most efficient model of corporate governance,
under the prevailing corporate paradigm. Maximizing stockholder wealth will thus ensure the
best allocation and deployment of resources with the result that overall social wealth will be
maximized.
4. See Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980) (describing how efficient markets for managers help to discipline corporate gover-
nance).
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have suggested some of the gains to be realized from removing those costs
and barriers.
They have accomplished all of this by reducing the prevailing corporate
paradigm to its most elemental level-the pursuit of self-interest by all
concerned.' Although my use of the collective pronoun suggests unity among
legal economists, there are in fact deep divisions among them. But on one
aspect of the corporate paradigm they are unanimous: Corporations exist
for their stockholders. Only when the corporation is thus focused can the
self-interest of corporate actors be used to maximize their own wealth in a
way that will lead to increased societal wealth.
6
Professor Ronald Green recognizes this when he talks about the meta-
phors of corporate law, 7 metaphors that have been turned into normative
principles by law and economics scholars.8 He writes about the need to
abandon these metaphors, in order to enable us both to see and understand
that the modern corporation profoundly affects the well-being of a number
of constituent groups in addition to the corporation's stockholders, and
that in fact corporate directors and managers recognize this. But Professor
Green relies too comfortably on metaphor as the problem. The problem is-
not simply one of metaphor. In fact the problem is far deeper in corporate
doctrine and theory and, ultimately, policy. Only when we address social
and moral issues in corporate law that appear at this depth can we begin
to resolve them. The fact that legal economists have pushed the traditional
paradigm to the extreme, exposing its root assumptions, permits us to
address the issues at just this level.
We know the way to efficiency. We also have begun to explore the
costs of efficiency. Professor Green's paper identifies, as does this Sym-
5. This model of pursuit of self-interest by all is grounded upon the underlying
assumption of neoclassical economics upon which the contractual paradigm is based: that
persons by nature act to maximize their own utility. See Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis
of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34
STAN. L. Rav. 1105, 1113 (1982) (book review) (noting utilitarian basis of neoclassical
economics).
6. Throughout this Comment I treat the stockholder-centric profit goal as not only the
economists' paradigm, but also the reigning paradigm in corporate law, a state of affairs that
I believe to be true notwithstanding the recent widespread adoption of corporate constituency
statutes. Although I have made a case for how these statutes, and recent case law, can be
interpreted as altering this paradigm, it is too early in the process of their development to
conclude that they have in fact done so. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Stdtutes, 70 Tax. L. Rav. 579
(1992).
7. Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate
Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409 (1993).
8. Dean Robert C. Clark has cogently criticized the metaphor of directors as agents of
the stockholders in Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PgiNcIPALs
AND AGENTS: THE STRu TURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985). Professor Victor Brudney has done the same with respect to the contract metaphor.
Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. Rav. 1403 (1985).
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posium, some of the values that get left behind when the efficiency model
becomes paradigm. Essentially it all boils down to the realization that a
single-minded focus on efficiency, on the corporation as a narrowly defined
economic institution, sacrifices the human values of those who play a part
in its functioning. The efficiency model does this by legally cabining the
actions of corporate actors within confining, distinctly nonhuman roles. It
is this denial of humanity, which ultimately denies reality, that is at the
heart of the current debate over stakeholder status.
Philosopher Elizabeth Wolgast has addressed this tendency to dehu-
manize from the perspective of moral philosophy.9 The moral concern stems
from the fact that, regardless of our paradigm or metaphors, corporate
decisions do have effects, sometimes profound, on the lives of others. How,
she asks, can artificial persons be said to have moral responsibility for these
decisions when they are made by collectivities of humans in which the moral
responsibility for the decision is diffused, and therefore untraceable, and
who do not carry out those decisions and therefore do not share in the
morally important experience of living through and with those decisions?
The question of moral responsibility is critical because in order to
establish the legitimacy of stakeholder concerns in the internal governance
of the corporation, we first must determine whether the corporation has an
obligation to these stakeholder groups. By this I do not mean, of course,
a legal obligation, for the answer given by contemporary legal doctrine is
rather clear: it has none.'0 What I do mean is obligation in the ethical or
moral sense, in light of the fact that corporations can and do affect the
interests of these other constituents." The traditional denial of legal obli-
gation is based upon the ethic of self-reliance, which essentially has been
refined to the policy of economic efficiency. In other words, legal decision-
makers have treated nonstockholder constituents as able to protect them-
selves against corporate externalities created in the pursuit of stockholder
profit through the contracting process and, when it fails (as in the case of
environmental externalities, for example), through legislation aimed not at
the corporate governance process, but at conduct external to it. In the areas
of creditors' and employees' rights, which have received the greatest legal
attention, the claiming stakeholders are blamed for their own failure to
protect themselves. The blame is premised both on the notion that they are
able to do so and the belief, noted by Professor Green, that efficient
corporate operations will suffer if directors are made to divide their loyalties
among potentially competing corporate groups.
9. ELIZABE WOLGAST, ETucs OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON (1992).
10. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1165 (1990) (discussing lack of bondholders' rights); Mitchell, supra note 6 (discussing
lack of rights of other constituents generally).
11. In his recent Baffi Lecture, Amartya Sen cautions against the dangers of accepting
the narrowly focused stockholder profit motive without careful regard for the consequences
of doing so. Amartya Sen, Money and Value: On the Ethics and Economics of Finance, 9
EcoN. & Piru. 203 (1993).
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The question of whether nonstockholder constituents are able to protect
themselves is very real and important. Certainly some of these groups do
have some opportunity to decide whether or not to deal with a particular
corporation and to have some influence upon the terms. Other stakeholder
groups, like the broader communities in which the corporations operate,
and those asserting environmental interests, have little if any chance to
affect their relationship with the corporation, except possibly through the
attenuated legislative process. Even those groups that can arguably protect
themselves may be able to do so by avoiding a particular corporation-but
clearly they cannot avoid dealing with corporations generally. And the
bargaining power they have in this respect is sorely limited. A particular
union or group of employees bargains with individual corporations, but
corporations as an entire category of institution are united by the stockholder
profit motive. Thus their power and incentives, are backed by the mandate
of law, whereas the stakeholder groups are left to exert what private power
they may have in individual cases. In other words, the law privileges
corporations as a class to behave differently than do natural persons or
even other institutions-it privileges them to externalize the costs of stock-
holder profit maximization on others, and to defend this externalization on
the basis of the legal mandate to maximize stockholder profits.
Perhaps more importantly, once the stakeholder has entered into a
contractual relationship, if any, with the corporation, it loses all control
over the conduct of that relationship outside of the contract terms.' 2 And
the contract terms in any relational contract will necessarily be incomplete. 3
Nor can these groups look to contract doctrine to protect them, because in
cases in which the meaning of the only nontextual remedy, the implied
covenant of good faith, has been applied, courts have defined and limited
it by the motive of stockholder profit and by narrow reference to the
necessarily limited contractual terms.' 4 Thus the corporation's directors can
assume a monopoly of power, and the self-protective ability of even con-
tracting stakeholders is dramatically diminished if not entirely lost.
It is this monopoly of power that gives rise to the moral dilemma.
Corporations do have the power to affect others' interests. We would expect
human persons who possess such power to act with a sense of their own
moral accountability. Not only do we not expect corporations to so act; we
have legally prohibited them from doing so.
The prohibition takes the well-known doctrinal form of the profit
purpose, judicially articulated in its most famous form in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.' 5 and most recently enshrined, with unsatisfying modifications,
12. Economist Oliver Williamson has recognized that stakeholders lose control of their
relationship with the corporation, outside the contract terms, in his transactions cost model
of the corporation. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
13. IAN R. MAcNEiL, THE NE w SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); William W. Bratton, Jr., The
Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wils. L. Rav. 667, 691-92.
14. See Mitchell, Fairness Rights, supra note 10.
15. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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in the recently adopted American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance.16 This doctrine, far more than metaphor, legally mandates the
corporation's purpose as generating profits for its stockholders. It thus
creates the corporation, as Wolgast has noted, as a very strange type of
person, one with an end, a substantive "good" if you will, that sets it
dramatically apart from other types of persons. But it does more. By
mandating stockholder profit as the sole justification for the corporation's
existence, it casts the flesh and blood persons who animate the corporation
in roles that conform them to corporate personhood, thereby requiring them
to abandon the personhood they otherwise have achieved as human beings.
When directors act as directors, when managers act as managers, they too
act as persons whose sole good, whose moral reality, consists in the
generation of profits for stockholders. In effect, they are legally absolved
of the moral accountability of persons, and take on the moral parameters
of the role. They thus justify their conduct by reference to the morality of
this role, rather than by reference to their own personhood. The consequence
is that these corporate actors have no feeling of moral accountability,
because in law, and thus perhaps in fact, they have none.
Of course all of this turns on whether one believes in a concept of
personhood that transcends one's socially constructed roles. I will not
elaborate on the argument for this, but simply accept that such a concept
is valid and refer the reader to arguments made elsewhere, on which I base
this discussion. 17 For purposes of my argument, however, I need not defend
this proposition, because the legal economists also have premised their
arguments on the assumption that there is a reality of personhood that
transcends role. That concept is the model of economic man.
Economic man is rational. As defined by the legal economists, this
rationality requires that he maximize his utility in all of his activities. In
the corporate sphere, which undeniably is, at its core, an economic aspect
of life, this maxmimization of utility requires that he maximize his own
wealth from the corporation. The economic paradigm of the corporation is
based upon this concept of personhood, and the traditional paradigm of
corporate law probably is as well. 8
Again by exposing this essential element of personhood, the legal
economists have done us the favor of clarifying the issues and facilitating
our discussion of the corporate paradigm on precisely these terms. And
again, by pushing this element to its extreme, they have revealed the
16. PRNcnqLas OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSiS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(Proposed Final Draft 1992). For a discussion of how this provision fails to get beyond the
traditional paradigm, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern
Corporation (forthcoming).
17. See Mitchell, supra note 16.
18. For a more elaborate statement of my views on the legitimacy of this model of the
person, see Ldwrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Nature Versus Human Nature, in CRTIcs oF
INsTrruTiONs: LAw AND EcoNoMcs (Robin Malloy ed., forthcoming).
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weaknesses inherent in the concept of personhood and, ultimately, the
corporate paradigm.
Nobody is rational in the way that the economists suggest.19 There is
substantial evidence that persons forego self-interest in a wide variety of
circumstances, heeding the calls of duty, restraint, altruism, and friendship.
20
Of course economists have argued that these apparently other-regarding
behaviors can be explained on the basis of self-interest, but the arguments
so severely atfenuate the concept of self-interest that they' destroy the utility
of the concept. Moreover, even those economists who have found an
apparently biological2' or psychological basis2" in self-interest for other-
directed conduct hardly deny that the conduct itself accounts for the interests
of others, in a manner similar to, although differently motivated than,
other-regarding conduct based on moral precepts. To sustain the notion
that self-interest is the exclusive human motivation is to so broaden the
concept of self-interest that it denies the explanatory power of the model
of self-interest.
There is at least one possible way in which the model of self-interest
can be broadened to cover other-regarding conduct, but the argument as
formulated is foreign to the economists' conception of self-interest. Neera
Kapur Badhwar has argued that not only are altruistic acts compatible with
a type of self-interest, but the relevant self-interest both has independent
moral significance and is essential to the truly altruistic character of such
acts.?3 Badhwar examines the case of people who rescued Jews from the
Nazis in occupied Europe during World War II and concludes that some
class of these people acted from the self-interested motive of affirming their
altruistic identity, a motive Badhwar describes as different from the desire
to make one feel good about oneself or seek any other type of internal or
external personal reward:
Because altruism was a central and unambiguous part of their very
identity, rescuers had an interest in helping others not just for the
sake of those others, but also for the sake of being true to themselves
and affirming themselves. And the two motivations had a necessary
connection because each was part of a wholehearted altruism, acting
from which meant that in acting on the one they would also,
necessarily, act on the other? 4
19. Well, almost nobody. In a well-known experiment designed to test whether individuals
are prone to engage in economic "free-riding," Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames found that
only one class of persons is so inclined: graduate students in economics. See Gerald Marwell
& Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?, 15 J. PuB. EcoN. 295, 309
(1981).
20. For an extended discussion of duty, restraint, altruism and friendship see JAMsS Q.
WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993).
21. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON (1988).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT M. AxELROD, Tim EVoLUTIoN OF COOPERATION (1984).
23. Neera Kapur Badhwar, Altruism versus Self-Interest: Sometimes A False Dichotomy,
in ALTRUIsM 90 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993).
24. Id. at 115.
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This obviously is quite a different conception of self-interest, one that is
concerned in a Kantian way with persons, including oneself, as ends in
themselves, which is quite foreign to the economists' explanations that view
other-regarding conduct as a means to achieving one's own, more temporal
ends. The self-interest in affirming one's altruistic identity is of a very
different nature than behaving altruistically to gratify one's emotional or
physiological desires.
A more important question is whether we want people to premise their
actions on the basis of self-interest. In light of the legal economists'
argument, the question becomes compelling. To the extent that we actually
accept the model as an explanation for human behavior, we run the
significant risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy-that is, we accept it
as a justification for our own behavior, regardless of what we believe our
motivations to be.Y Perhaps more significantly, we accept it as an adequate
justification of the institutional roles premised upon it. We are thus faced
with a question that is answered not by reference to essential human nature,
since obviously both self-interest and concern for others coexist within us,
26
but a question that is answered by choice: how should we behave as human
beings?
This, of course, is a fundamentally moral question. 27 But it is one that
is no less relevant when we are talking about persons acting within corpo-
rations than when we are talking about their actions in other spheres of
life. And, as I have suggested, it is a question that necessarily is posed by
the legal economists, precisely because it is so definitively answered by their
assumptions of personhood that undergird their model of the corporation.
Within the scope of this Comment, I can only provide the outlines of
an answer to this question. 21 And I will do so first by refining the question
itself through an examination of the premise of the phrase I used in the
25. WILsoN, supra note 20, at 229-30. It is interesting to note that during the past year
a great deal of commentary has suggested that Americans are becoming more concerned with
questions of their individual and collective responsibilities for others, in contrast to the early
1980s when the predominant social ethos was that self-interest, indeed greed, were not only
valid but desirable social traits. A brief, if unscientific, look at American history reveals a
pattern of these two ethos alternating over time. It is worth noting, though I am not able to
draw any strong conclusions from this, that the Reagan administration which took office in
1981 slightly preceded the predominance of the ethic of self-interest and self-reliance, and that
the Clinton administration, which took office in 1993 espousing communitarian philosophy,
coincided with the reemergence of an ethic of concern and responsibility. The weak conclusion
that I draw from these observations is that how we behave is very much affected by how we
believe we should behave, and that how we believe we should behave as a society and
individuals within a society is importantly affected by how our leaders tell us we should
behave.
26. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE A PoI.rrcS (1975); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAgv. L. Rav. 1685 (1976).
27. ARISTOTLE NICOMACHE a ETIcs, Book 1, at 1094a25 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
28. I take up these issues (and others) in more detail in Mitchell, supra note 16.
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preceding paragraph, ". . . when we are talking about persons acting within
corporations. . . ." I will then address what seems to me to be the clear
answer to this question and suggest some of its implications. I will show,
I hope, that the best answer demands a broader concept of the person than
that assumed, or asserted, by the legal economists and instantiated in the
law of corporations. This broader understanding of the person necessarily
leads to the conclusion that some constituency consideration is not only
appropriate but necessary to permit corporate actors to function as persons.
"Persons acting within the corporation." The phrase suggests a setting
apart of a person's actions in one context or role from those in others. Do
persons acting within a corporation differ from persons acting in their
family relationships or their relationships with those in their institutions of
worship or in their country clubs or in the other institutional roles they
play in our society? Evidence exists to suggest that we think that they do,
or at least that persons acting within corporations think that they do. Jay
Lorsch, in Pawns or Potentates,29 interviewed a large number of corporate
directors who asserted their beliefs that they had responsibilities to those
outside the law-given framework of the corporation, but that their ability
to act upon those responsibilities was severely constrained by the legal
mandate to act only in the interests of the stockholders. And our common
parlance abounds with references to the idea that the business context is
somehow different, that "business is business." 30 As Alan Wolfe has illus-
trated in his book, Whose Keeper?,31 the idea of a business morality set
apart from a person's normal moral context traces at least as far back as
Adam Smith. Wolfe himself, in that book, although less so in his paper
for this conference, 32 while supporting a more communitarian vision of our
social institutions, seems to regard business as a sphere apart. So the idea
of a distinct business persona that is somehow different from a person's
"normal" persona appears to be pervasive. Even one of the great moralistic
judges, Benjamin Cardozo, recognized a distinct "morals of the market-
place" that was somehow separate and apart from the morals applicable
outside the marketplace. 3
What does this mean? It suggests that a different moral code governs
business relations. While it may be that the legal economists' notion of self-
29. JAY LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS
(1989).
30. See especially the delightful, and pointed, response of the Once-ler in Dr. Seuss's
THE LoRAx: "For business is business and business must grow, regardless of crummies in
tummies you know." Ronald Gilson, one of the leading legal economists in the corporate
field, has used this line as the epigraph to his book on corporate acquisitions. RONALD A.
GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS xix (1986). One suspects that
Gilson is deliberately disregarding Seuss's irony.
31. ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? (1989).
32. See Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1673 (1993).
33. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). Of course Cardozo did not believe
that such morals were applicable to intimate business relationships like partnerships.
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interest is too narrow, it certainly is the case that an embedded corporate
law concept demands that corporate actors go about their duties solely in
pursuit of stockholder profits. Other considerations that might occur to
them outside the corporate context, perhaps even in their own personal
business dealings, are to be put aside under sanction of law. This general
mandate of profit maximization, while described as the "purpose" of the
corporation, thus defines the role of every actor within the corporation.
And by so defining and constraining those roles, it excuses corporate actors
from moral responsibility for actions taken within those roles that adversely
affect others in ways that we normally would consider immoral. Moreover,
by doing so, it not only absolves corporate actors from moral responsibility,
but permits them to deny any moral accountability. No feelings of guilt are
required when the stream is polluted or the baby food is diluted or the
Pinto explodes. The institution defines the moral role, and in the case of
the corporation the moral role is narrow indeed. So, as David Luban
suggests in a related context, we must determine whether the role itself is
morally justifiable.3
The legal economist would tell us that it is. Although persons may act
in seemingly altruistic ways outside of the corporation, although for self-
interested motives, there is a societal good in having corporations and their
actors work to maximize profit without regard to other considerations. That
good is the overall maximization of social wealth, in which the corporation
is a vital tool, which would necessarily be impeded by permitting corporate
actors to deviate from the strict model by creating inefficiencies in the form
of increased monitoring costs .3 Thus the morality of the role is justified
by utilitarian philosophy. Permitting the functional specialization that leads
to maximum social utility requires moral specialization as well. If corporate
actors were to be concerned about the effects of their actions on persons
other than stockholders, they could not perform their tasks efficiently.
But this leads to the important question of whether the specialized roles
we have created for corporate actors are the roles of persons? Does one
who acts only-with the narrow and exclusive purposes of corporate actors
behave as a person? Again, the question of the nature of personhood is
one that is well beyond the scope of this Comment. But, also again, I need
not explore it to disprove the economists' claims, for even the legal econ-
omists have a richer conception of person than corporate automaton. Even
they allow for other-regarding behaviors, when it is necessary to maximize
one's own self-interest. But the corporate role we have defined excludes the
possibility, or at least the legality, of such other-directed behavior. So
"normal" economic behavior and corporate behavior conflict.
And on a broader concept of personhood, the conflict is even sharper.
As Wolgast asks in exploring the notion of corporate personhood:
34. DAvID LuBAN, LAwYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETmcAL SrUDY (1988).
35. I need not, for purposes of this Comment, examine the morality of the goal of
increased societal wealth. I think a sufficiently persuasive answer is provided by Ronald M.
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
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Understood as devices for making money, corporations more closely
resemble machines than human beings. Humans have no such limited
"purpose," and their connections with others include many that
are (financially) unprofitable and even taxing. The question must
be addressed, then, in what sense are we to understand the fictional
personhood of such entities?
3 6
By transitivity, it is a question that must be asked of those who assume the
limited roles that the law sets forth for corporate actors. And the answer
to the question, an answer with which, as I have suggested, the economists
must agree, is that corporate actors are no types of persons at all.
What is the consequence of concluding that the roles filled by corporate
actors in our reigning paradigm of the corporation are not the roles of
persons? It seems to me that at least two possibilities follow. The first is
that we need not treat corporate actors as persons at all, at least while they
are acting within the confines of their corporate roles. The second is that
we need to change the roles so that these corporate actors can function as
socially embedded persons, regardless of whether they are acting in their
corporate capacity.
The first consequence leads to a number of possible moves. The first
is that corporate actors, while so acting, need not be granted the panoply
of rights that persons in our society have been granted. The freedoms we
associate with personhood are based on the liberal ideal of autonomous
actors defining and seeking their ends. And we restrain these freedoms only
to the extent necessary to ensure that their actions do not impede the
autonomy of others. Yet, by definition, corporate actors within their roles
are disabled from defining their ends, and can work only towards the end
that is given to them by the role. Thus the predicate for granting those
rights is gone. And we are thus free to restrain these actors to any extent
desirable so that their role performances will best achieve our collective
vision of social welfare. By transitivity, of course, this denial of personhood
would extend to the corporation, which traditionally and constitutionally
has been granted such status. The way is thus clear to regulate the corpo-
ration extensively to achieve social purposes.
A corollary of this freedom to constrain corporate actors and corpo-
rations themselves is that we can alter the roles as we see fit. Because the
roles are insitutionally defined and because the institutions are socially
created through our legal processes, we are free to impose our collective
will on the behavior of corporate actors in light of shifting goals. In either
case, the consequence of the narrow concept of the corporate actor, with
its logical denial of personhood, puts our capitalist ideal in jeopardy, given
the extent to which that ideal is realized through corporate conduct. In
essence, the nonperson corporation is well poised to be animated by the
state.
36. WOLGAST, supra note 9, at 81.
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The second consequence it seems to me is both far more consonant
with our political and social ideals and is also far more protective of our
capitalist system. That consequence is to free corporate actors to behave as
morally whole persons, albeit within a particular role. Nothing inherent in
the concept of role requires that roles be so narrowly drawn, nor requires
that such roles demand a denial of social embeddedness. 37 In fact all of us
fill a variety of roles, which sometimes overlap and which often require
that we call upon aspects of our other roles in fulfilling the demands of
each. I myself am a father, a husband, a teacher, a scholar, an investor, a
Jew, and a friend, to name some of the roles I fill on a daly basis. Leaving
aside the difficult philosophical question of whether there is a "me" behind
these roles (for what it's worth, I believe that there is), it is true at a
minimum that the "nexus" of these roles, if you will pardon the expression,
substantially defines who I am. It would be impossible for me to function
exclusively in one of these roles for any portion of my day by denying the
relevance of these other roles to my persona and performance. I am not a
psychologist, but I suspect the result would be some form of cognitive
dissonance. The fact that corporate actors feel some of this dissonance is
demonstrated by Lorsch's survey of corporate directors, most of whom
were in fact trying to fill one role exclusively for a portion of their lives."
Moreover, it seems undesirable, even if it were possible to achieve without
severe psychological distress, to demand that anyone supress these other
roles in their daily conduct, because often the experiences people have in
these other roles help inform their conduct in other contexts. Allowing
corporate actors to recognize the relevance of their other roles would permit
them to be more responsive, and more responsible, in fulfilling the functions
of their corporate roles.
Making these other roles relevant would also make corporate actors
morally accountable for their conduct in their corporate roles. Once the
artificially narrow constraint of the profit motive is removed, corporate
actors would be empowered to see the corporation as one among a variety
of institutions and as having morally relevant effects on others. This hardly
means an abandonment of the profit motive, but puts it in a context that
more naturally makes it only one of the actor's responsibilities, even if, as
Wolfe has suggested and I agree, it is primary among their responsibilities.
Corporate actors thus will behave as persons, and can and should be given
greater freedom so to act. Because in fact they are persons. And this greater
freedom, this greater flexibility, fulfills the demands of efficiency by making
the corporation an overall more responsive market-driven institution.
What has all of this got to do with constituencies? The answer should
be clear. By modifying, if not eliminating, the narrow concept of corporate
purpose, corporate actors, as morally accountable actors, will consider and
37. See ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER ViRTuE 33-34 (1981) (noting ubiquity of role and
normal state that roles are not exclusive of one another or one's broader moral context).
38. See LoRscH, supra note 29.
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be mindful of the effects of their behavior on other persons, including
those actors most affected by the corporation at any one time.39 And this
modification of corporate purpose, designed as it is specifically to permit
these actors to behave as whole, morally accountable persons, necessarily
requires that the law permit corporate actors to do so. The recognition by
corporations of constituent interests is a logical corollary of recognizing the
personhood of corporate actors.
This is not to propose, nor have I advocated, complete anarchy within
the corporation. Some legal structure is necessary to direct the corporation's
energies and I have elsewhere provided some ideas for such a structure.40
All that I am suggesting in this Comment is that the paradigm-sharpening
by the legal economists demonstrates not only the unreality of that para-
digm, 4' but its immorality, as well. It thus clarifies the need for a new
model of corporate law. The constituency model of the corporation is
merely the structure within which that new paradigm is expressed.
39. Of course it's not this simple-merely changing corporate purpose does not require
that corporate actors consider other constituents. For more detailed discussion I refer the
reader to WOLGAST, supra note 9, and Mitchell, supra note 16.
40. Mitchell, supra note 6; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Gov-
ernance, 45 VAND. L. Rv. 1263 (1992).
41. See Wolfe, supra note 32.
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